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Tax evasion as a determinant of corruption: a game-theoretical analysis

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  • Sokolovska, Olena
  • Sokolovskyi, Dmytro

Abstract

We consider a static non-cooperative game theoretic model of tax evasion. Some concepts concerned with strategies of interaction between economic agents are formalized in order to determine further possible presence of corrupt practices.

Suggested Citation

  • Sokolovska, Olena & Sokolovskyi, Dmytro, 2015. "Tax evasion as a determinant of corruption: a game-theoretical analysis," MPRA Paper 66423, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2015.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:66423
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax evasion; game theory; corruption; behavior;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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