IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Determinants of successful electricity market reform


  • Erdogdu, Erkan


The paper explores whether the question of why some countries are able to implement more extensive reforms is closely related to the question of why some countries have better institutions than others. We analyse this question by using empirical econometric models with cross-section data covering 51 countries. The results show that both the background of the regulator and the energy minister and the institutional endowments of a country are important determinants of how far reforms have gone in a country. Our results suggest that the best first chairman of a regulatory agency, in terms of reform progress, seems to be one with a degree in law or engineering and one with a long period in office. The best minister responsible for energy policy when regulator is set up is, on the other hand, one with a degree in business or economics and one who has as little experience in the electricity industry as possible and does not have a degree in law. The results also put forward that any improvement in the structure of the legal system, security of property rights, democracy or investment environment positively contributes to the reform progress in a country. However, there seems to be a negative relationship between reform progress and both civil liberties and political rights.

Suggested Citation

  • Erdogdu, Erkan, 2011. "Determinants of successful electricity market reform," MPRA Paper 38410, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:38410

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Erdogdu, Erkan, 2011. "The impact of power market reforms on electricity price-cost margins and cross-subsidy levels: A cross country panel data analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 1080-1092, March.
    2. Littlechild, S.C. & Skerk, C.J., 2004. "Regulation of transmission expansion in Argentina Part I: State ownership, reform and the Fourth Line," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0464, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item


    Electricity market reform; new institutional economics; Poisson regression;

    JEL classification:

    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:38410. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.