Turkish voter response to government incompetence and corruption related to the 1999 earthquakes
The two major earthquakes which struck northwestern Turkey in 1999, caused enormous amounts of death and destruction, and exposed rampant government corruption involving construction and zoning code violations, as a factor magnifying the disaster. The opposition parties and one of the incumbent parties which participated in previous national governments and held power in current and past municipal administrations were responsible for that. The other two incumbent parties came to power only a short time before the earthquakes and controlled almost none of the local administrations in the disaster zone. They on the other hand, were responsible for the incompetence shown in providing relief, for involvement in corruption related to those efforts, and for failing to prosecute the businessmen who constructed the shoddy buildings and the corrupt officials who permitted them. How voters responded to these in the 2002 parliamentary elections is investigated, using cross-provincial data, controlling for other social, political and economic factors. The fact that different groups of parties were responsible for different types of corruption and mismanagement provided us with a unique data to differentiate between voter responses to corruption and incompetence, and to corruption which has occurred before and after the earthquakes. Our results show that voters punished all of the political parties which participated in governments during the previous decade. The party in charge of the ministry responsible for disaster relief, and parties that controlled more of the city administrations in the quake zone were blamed more. The newly formed Justice and Development Party (AKP) was the main beneficiary of the votes lost by these parties. Our results corroborate the view in the corruption literature that voters react drastically only when the corruption is massive, the information on it highly-credible and well-publicized, involves large number of political parties, not accompanied by competent governance, and a non-corrupt alternative is available.
|Date of creation:||11 Jan 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Elena Costas-Pérez & Albert Solé-Ollé & Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, 2011.
"Corruption scandals, press reporting, and accountability. Evidence from Spanish mayors,"
2011/9, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Elena Costas & Albert Sole-Olle & Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, 2011. "Corruption scandals, press reporting, and accountability. Evidence from Spanish mayors," Working Papers in Economics 255, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
- Ferraz, Claudio & Finan, Frederico S., 2007.
"Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes,"
IZA Discussion Papers
2836, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2008. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 123(2), pages 703-745.
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Khalid Sekkat, 2005.
"Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of growth?,"
Springer, vol. 122(1), pages 69-97, January.
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Khalid Sekkat, 2005. "Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of growth?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7364, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Chong, Alberto & De La O, Ana & Karlan, Dean S. & Wantchékon, Léonard, 2012.
"Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
8790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alberto Chong & Ana L. De La O & Dean Karlan & Leonard Wantchekon, 2012. "Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes," Working Papers 1005, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
- Chong, Alberto & De La O Torres, Ana L. & Karlan, Dean & Wantchekon, Leonard, 2012. "Looking beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes," Working Papers 94, Yale University, Department of Economics.
- Alberto Chong & Ana L. De La O & Dean Karlan & Leonard Wantchekon, 2011. "Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 17679, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Monica Escaleras & Nejat Anbarci & Charles Register, 2007. "Public sector corruption and major earthquakes: A potentially deadly interaction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 209-230, July.
- Akarca, Ali T. & Tansel, Aysit, 2007. "Social and Economic Determinants of Turkish Voter Choice in the 1995 Parliamentary Election," IZA Discussion Papers 2881, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Zaman, Asad & Rousseeuw, Peter J. & Orhan, Mehmet, 2001.
"Econometric applications of high-breakdown robust regression techniques,"
Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 1-8, April.
- Zaman, Asad & Rousseeuw, Peter J. & Orhan, Mehmet, 2000. "Econometric applications of high-breakdown robust regression techniques," MPRA Paper 41529, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ali Akarca & Aysit Tansel, 2006. "Economic Performance and Political Outcomes: An Analysis of the Turkish Parliamentary and Local Election Results Between 1950 and 2004," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 77-105, October.
- Lorenzo Pellegrini & Reyer Gerlagh, 2008. "Causes of corruption: a survey of cross-country analyses and extended results," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 245-263, July.
- Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 409-14, May.
- Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1990.
"The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth,"
NBER Working Papers
3530, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1990. "The Allocation of Talent: Implicationsfor Growth," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 65, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Brunetti, Aymo & Weder, Beatrice, 2003. "A free press is bad news for corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1801-1824, August.
- Fikret Adaman & Ali Carkoglu, 2001. "Perceptions of the Central and Local Governments? Engagement in Corruptive Activities: the Case of Turkey," Working Papers 0103, Economic Research Forum, revised Jan 2001.
- Ali T. Akarca, 2011. "A prediction for AKP’s nationwide vote share in the 12 June 2011 Turkish parliamentary election," Iktisat Isletme ve Finans, Bilgesel Yayincilik, vol. 26(302), pages 53-74.
- Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, 1999.
"Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?,"
NBER Working Papers
7108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Cole, Shawn & Healy, Andrew & Werker, Eric, 2012. "Do voters demand responsive governments? Evidence from Indian disaster relief," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 167-181.
- Daniel Lederman & Norman V. Loayza & Rodrigo R. Soares, 2005.
"Accountability And Corruption: Political Institutions Matter,"
Economics and Politics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17, pages 1-35, 03.
- Lederman, Daniel & Loayza, Norman & Reis Soares, Rodrigo, 2001. "Accountability and corruption : political institutions matter," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2708, The World Bank.
- Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2002. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1415-1451.
- Nejat Anbarci & Monica Escaleras & Charles Register, 2006.
"Traffic Fatalities and Public Sector Corruption,"
06004, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University, revised Jul 2006.
- Mushfiq Swaleheen, 2011. "Economic growth with endogenous corruption: an empirical study," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 23-41, January.
- Ali T. Akarca, 2010. "Analysis of the 2009 Turkish Election Results from an Economic Voting Perspective," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(3), pages 3-38.
- Matthew Gentzkow & Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia Goldin, 2006.
"The Rise of the Fourth Estate. How Newspapers Became Informative and Why It Mattered,"
in: Corruption and Reform: Lessons from America's Economic History, pages 187-230
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Matthew Gentzkow & Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia Goldin, 2004. "The Rise of the Fourth Estate: How Newspapers Became Informative and Why It Mattered," NBER Working Papers 10791, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Henderson, J. Vernon & Kuncoro, Ari, 2011. "Corruption and local democratization in Indonesia: The role of Islamic parties," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 164-180, March.
- Freille, Sebastian & Haque, M. Emranul & Kneller, Richard, 2007. "A contribution to the empirics of press freedom and corruption," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 838-862, December.
- Noel Johnson & Courtney LaFountain & Steven Yamarik, 2011. "Corruption is bad for growth (even in the United States)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 377-393, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:35894. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.