Bidding behaviors in eBay auctions: secret reservation price and endogenous entry
This paper analyzes the secret reservation price in eBay auctions. Under the assumptions of secret and public reservation price, the bidders choose the optimal bidding function and the seller selects equilibrium reservation price. This model argues that the choice of secret reservation price is rational for the seller, as they can generate higher revenue in certain conditions. It predicts that, under endogenous entry, secret reservation price leads to higher revenue since it attracts more bidders to the auction. This effect is more noticeable for luxury goods. However, secret and public reservation prices generate identical revenue for the seller if entry is exogenous. Furthermore, the results are supported by numerous recent empirical works.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies 5.3(2011): pp. 326-331|
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- Vincent Daniel R., 1995. "Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May Be Kept Secret," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 575-584, April.
- Vuong, Q. & Laffont, J.J. & Elyakime, B. & Loisel, P., 1995. "Auctioning and Bargaining: An Econometric Study of Timber Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices," Papers 9502, Southern California - Department of Economics.
- Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1996. "Optimal Reservation Prices in Auctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(438), pages 1271-83, September.
- David Lucking-Reiley & Doug Bryan & Naghi Prasad & Daniel Reeves, 2007. "PENNIES FROM EBAY: THE DETERMINANTS OF PRICE IN ONLINE AUCTIONS -super-* ," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 223-233, 06.
- Elyakime, Bernard, et al, 1997. "Auctioning and Bargaining: An Econometric Study of Timber Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 15(2), pages 209-20, April.
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