IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bes/jnlbes/v15y1997i2p209-20.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Auctioning and Bargaining: An Econometric Study of Timber Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices

Author

Listed:
  • Elyakime, Bernard, et al

Abstract

This paper considers a first-place sealed-bid auction where the seller's reservation price is not announced in advance. The authors allow for a second-round of bargaining and consider the Nash bargaining outcome when the object is unsold after the auctioning round. They characterize the bidder's and seller's Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategies. The distributions of the buyers' and sellers' private values are estimated by nonlinear least squares from auction data on standing timber while solving numerically the differential equations characterizing the equilibrium strategies. The performance of the estimated model is compared to a model in which the players behave myopically. Coauthors are Jean-Jacques Laffont, Patrice Loisel, and Quang Vuong.

Suggested Citation

  • Elyakime, Bernard, et al, 1997. "Auctioning and Bargaining: An Econometric Study of Timber Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 15(2), pages 209-220, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bes:jnlbes:v:15:y:1997:i:2:p:209-20
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bes:jnlbes:v:15:y:1997:i:2:p:209-20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christopher F. Baum (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.amstat.org/publications/jbes/index.cfm?fuseaction=main .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.