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Tensión diplomática entre Colombia y Ecuador durante 2006-2009: una mirada desde la teoría de juegos
[Diplomatic tension between Colombia and Ecuador during 2006-2009: a look from the theory of games]


  • Arroyo, Santiago
  • Bolaños, Juan


This paper centres his analysis on the diplomatic tension between Colombia and Ecuador during the period 2006-2009. For it, is studied from the game theory,the diplomatic tension that both countries faced, product the air fumigations that Colombia realized in the zone of border with the Ecuador an territory, as well as the assault trealized by the Colombian army to the camp of the revolutionary Armed forces of colombia (Farc), where Raúl Reyes was brought down. Of particular form, modelling a Not cooperative game of complete information, which proved an Efficient Nash Equilibrium for pure actions, where every country understands that the tension between both, it is affecting the importance of the binational agenda.

Suggested Citation

  • Arroyo, Santiago & Bolaños, Juan, 2010. "Tensión diplomática entre Colombia y Ecuador durante 2006-2009: una mirada desde la teoría de juegos
    [Diplomatic tension between Colombia and Ecuador during 2006-2009: a look from the theory of gam
    ," MPRA Paper 28751, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 18 Nov 2010.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:28751

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    2. Arroyo, Santiago & Alegría, Alexander, 2009. "El conflicto colombo-venezolano y la construcción de escenarios desde la Teoría de Juegos
      [The Colombo-Venezuelan conflict and the construction of scenes from Theory of Games]
      ," MPRA Paper 24396, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Aug 2009.
    3. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June.
    4. Lester A. Zeager & Johnathan B. Bascom, 1996. "Strategic Behavior in Refugee Repatriation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 40(3), pages 460-485, September.
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    More about this item


    Game Theory; diplomatic relations;

    JEL classification:

    • F50 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - General
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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