Linking Strategic Interaction and Bargaining Theory: The Harsanyi-Schelling Debate on the Axiom of Symmetry
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- Alessandro Innocenti, 2005. "Linking Strategic Interaction and Bargaining Theory. The Harsanyi - Schelling Debate on the Axiom of Symmetry," Department of Economics University of Siena 468, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Pope, Devin G. & Pope, Jaren C. & Sydnor, Justin R., 2015. "Focal points and bargaining in housing markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 89-107.
- Attanasi, Giuseppe Marco & Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Montesano, Aldo, 2010.
"Non-cooperative games with chained confirmed proposals,"
TSE Working Papers
10-192, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Aurora GarcÃa Gallego & Nikolaos GeorgantzÃs & Aldo Montesano, 2010. "Non-cooperative games with chained confirmed proposals," LERNA Working Papers 10.02.308, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
- Innocenti, Alessandro, 2010. "How a psychologist informed economics: The case of Sidney Siegel," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 421-434, June.
- Attanasi, Giuseppe Marco & Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Montesano, Aldo, 2011. "An Experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with Confirmed Proposals," TSE Working Papers 11-274, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Correa Romar, 2014. "Mathematical Foci," Mathematical Economics Letters, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1-2), pages 1-7, August.
- Attanasi, Giuseppe & Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Montesano, Aldo, 2011. "An Experiment on Prisonerâ€™s Dilemma with Confirmed Proposals," LERNA Working Papers 11.23.357, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
- Bolton, Gary E. & Karagözoğlu, Emin, 2016. "On the influence of hard leverage in a soft leverage bargaining game: The importance of credible claims," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 164-179.
- Alessandro Innocenti, 2008. "How can a psychologist inform economics? The strange case of Sidney Siegel," Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID) University of Siena 0808, Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID), University of Siena.
More about this item
KeywordsJohn Harsanyi; Thomas C. Schelling; axiom of symmetry;
- B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
- B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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