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An Experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with Confirmed Proposals

  • Attanasi, Giuseppe
  • Garcia-Gallego, Aurora
  • Georgantzis, Nikolaos
  • Montesano, Aldo

We apply an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of signing a cooperative agreement in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players’ willingness to cooperate and on their beliefs about the others’ type.

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Paper provided by LERNA, University of Toulouse in its series LERNA Working Papers with number 11.23.357.

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Date of creation: Dec 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ler:wpaper:25432
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  1. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  2. repec:att:wimass:9102 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Alessandro Innocenti, 2005. "Linking Strategic Interaction and Bargaining Theory. The Harsanyi - Schelling Debate on the Axiom of Symmetry," Department of Economics University of Siena 468, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  4. Andreoni, James A & Miller, John H, 1993. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(418), pages 570-85, May.
  5. Nikos Nikiforakis & Hans-Theo Normann & Brian Wallace, 2009. "Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_20, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  6. John Duffy & Jack Ochs, 2006. "Cooperative Behavior and the Frequency of Social Interaction," Working Papers 274, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2008.
  7. Sutton, John, 1986. "Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 709-24, October.
  8. Sabater-Grande, Gerardo & Georgantzis, Nikolaos, 2002. "Accounting for risk aversion in repeated prisoners' dilemma games: an experimental test," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 37-50, May.
  9. Tullock, Gordon, 1999. "Non-prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 455-458, July.
  10. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
  11. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1991. "A Note on Bargaining over a Finite Number of Feasible Agreements," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 290-92, July.
  12. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  13. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Montesano, Aldo, 2010. "Non-cooperative games with chained confirmed proposals," TSE Working Papers 10-192, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  14. Chun-Lei Yang & Ching-Syang Jack Yue & I-Tang Yu, 2007. "The rise of cooperation in correlated matching prisoners dilemma: An experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 3-20, March.
  15. Sutton, John, 1987. "Bargaining experiments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 272-284.
  16. Smale, Steve, 1980. "The Prisoner's Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1617-34, November.
  17. Cubitt, Robin P & Sugden, Robert, 1994. "Rationally Justifiable Play and the Theory of Non-cooperative Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(425), pages 798-803, July.
  18. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
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