Non-cooperative games with chained confirmed proposals
We propose a bargaining process with alternating proposals as a way of solving non-cooperative games, giving rise to Pareto efficient agreements which will, in general, differ from the Nash equilibrium of the constituent games.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||Jan 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (+33) 5 61 12 86 23
Web page: http://www.toulouse.inra.fr/lerna/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sutton, John, 1987. "Bargaining experiments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 272-284.
- J. Ochs & Alvin E. Roth, 1998.
"An experimental study of sequential bargaining,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
331, David K. Levine.
- Nikos Nikiforakis & Hans-Theo Normann & Brian Wallace, 2010.
"Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma,"
Southern Economic Journal,
Southern Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 638-659, January.
- Nikos Nikiforakis & Hans-Theo Normann & Brian Wallace, 2009. "Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_20, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Nikos Nikiforakis & Hans-Theo Normann & Brian Wallace, 2007. "Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 982, The University of Melbourne.
- Smale, Steve, 1980. "The Prisoner's Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1617-34, November.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Cubitt, Robin P & Sugden, Robert, 1994. "Rationally Justifiable Play and the Theory of Non-cooperative Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(425), pages 798-803, July.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Alessandro Innocenti, 2008.
"Linking Strategic Interaction and Bargaining Theory: The Harsanyi-Schelling Debate on the Axiom of Symmetry,"
History of Political Economy,
Duke University Press, vol. 40(1), pages 111-132, Spring.
- Alessandro Innocenti, 2005. "Linking Strategic Interaction and Bargaining Theory. The Harsanyi - Schelling Debate on the Axiom of Symmetry," Department of Economics University of Siena 468, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
- Neelin, Janet & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Spiegel, Matthew, 1988. "A Further Test of Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 824-36, September.
- Sutton, John, 1986. "Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 709-24, October.
- Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
- Muthoo, Abhinay, 1991. "A Note on Bargaining over a Finite Number of Feasible Agreements," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 290-92, July.
- Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ler:wpaper:10.02.308. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Maxime MARTY)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.