Effect of Monetary Incentives on Institutional Deliveries: Evidence from the Janani Suraksha Yojna in India
This paper is the first attempt to rigorously evaluate the short term effects of the `Janani Suraksha Yojna' (Safe Motherhood Scheme), a nationwide conditional cash transfer program in India, launched in April 2005. Under the scheme, a woman delivering her child in a medical facility is provided monetary rewards. My difference-in-difference results indicate that in the initial one and a half years of its operation, the scheme did not have any effect on the disparity between the targeted and non-targeted states. In fact, the gap widened in this period, albeit marginally. But beginning from 2007, the targeted states have shown much larger improvements in the institutional deliveries, leading to a dramatic decline in the gap between the targeted and the non-targeted states. I also show that the convergence or differential improvement in access and availability of medical facilities are not driving my results.
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- Ariel Fiszbein & Norbert Schady & Francisco H.G. Ferreira & Margaret Grosh & Niall Keleher & Pedro Olinto & Emmanuel Skoufias, 2009. "Conditional Cash Transfers : Reducing Present and Future Poverty," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 2597, September.
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