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The role of authoritative media in Economics

Author Info

  • Bušs, Ginters

Abstract

The paper explores the link between authoritative media, which is called the public court in the paper, and economic prosperity. Three types of evidence are used. First, arguments of the superiority of the public court over traditional media are provided. Second, a formal model shows a causal effect from more authoritative media viewers to greater political efficiency. Finally, the paper presents an overview of empirical literature on the link between political efficiency and economic prosperity. The finding of the paper is that the public court facilitates economic prosperity regardless of whether the traditional media are politically biased or not.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17893/1/MPRA_paper_17893.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 17893.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17893
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Keywords: institutional economics; media; politics; public court; economic prosperity;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

  • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
  • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
  • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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  1. Djankov, Simeon & McLeish, Caralee & Nenova, Tatiana & Shleifer, Andrei, 2001. "Who owns the media?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2620, The World Bank.
  2. Timothy Besley & Andrea Prat, 2006. "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 720-736, June.
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  9. Shang-Jin Wei, 2000. "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 1-11, February.
  10. Baron, David P., 2006. "Persistent media bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 1-36, January.
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  12. Sanjeev Gupta, 1998. "Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?," IMF Working Papers 98/76, International Monetary Fund.
  13. Fabrizio Carmignani, 2007. "Efficiency of Institutions, Political Stability and Income Dynamics," The IUP Journal of Managerial Economics, IUP Publications, vol. 0(1), pages 6-30, February.
  14. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
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  16. Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "Media Bias," NBER Working Papers 9295, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Keefer, Philip & Knack, Stephen, 1997. "Why Don't Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test of Institutional Explanation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 590-602, July.
  18. A. Chong & C. Calderón, 2000. "Causality and Feedback Between Institutional Measures and Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 69-81, 03.
  19. Kaufmann, Daniel & Kraay, Aart & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 1999. "Governance matters," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2196, The World Bank.
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