Las señales no desaparecen, evolucionan: erosión informativa y señalización adaptativa bajo shocks exógenos de costo
[Signals Don't Disappear, They Evolve: Informational Erosion and Adaptive Signaling under Exogenous Cost Shocks]
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Heckman, James J. & Kautz, Tim, 2012.
"Hard evidence on soft skills,"
Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 451-464.
- Heckman, James J. & Kautz, Tim, 2012. "Hard Evidence on Soft Skills," IZA Discussion Papers 6580, IZA Network @ LISER.
- James J. Heckman & Tim D. Kautz, 2012. "Hard Evidence on Soft Skills," NBER Working Papers 18121, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aysun, Uluc, 2024.
"Technology diffusion and international business cycles,"
Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
- Uluc Aysun, 2023. "Technology diffusion and international business cycles," Working Papers 2023-02, University of Central Florida, Department of Economics.
- Henry S. Farber & Robert Gibbons, 1996.
"Learning and Wage Dynamics,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(4), pages 1007-1047.
- Henry S. Farber & Robert Gibbons, 1991. "Learning and Wage Dynamics," NBER Working Papers 3764, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Henry S. Farber & Robert Gibbons, 1994. "Learning and Wage Dynamics," Working Papers 707, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Noldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 1997.
"A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 118-156, March.
- Gerorg Nöldeke & Larry Samuelson, "undated". "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection In Signaling Markets," ELSE working papers 038, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Noldeke, G. & Samuelson, L., 1996. "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Working papers 9518r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Noeldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 1996. "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Economics Series 27, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Noldeke, G. & Samuelson, L., 1995. "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Working papers 9518, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987.
"Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
- John G. Riley, 2001. "Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 432-478, June.
- Kremer, Ilan & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2007. "Dynamic signaling and market breakdown," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 58-82, March.
- Brendan Daley & Brett Green, 2012. "Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1433-1504, July.
- Joseph G. Altonji & Charles R. Pierret, 2001.
"Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(1), pages 313-350.
- Joseph G. Altonji & Charles R. Pierret, "undated". "Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination," IPR working papers 97-18, Institute for Policy Resarch at Northwestern University.
- Joseph Altonji & Charles R. Pierret, 1997. "Employer learning and statistical discrimination," Working Paper Series, Macroeconomic Issues WP-97-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Joseph G. Altonji & Charles R. Pierret, 1997. "Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination," NBER Working Papers 6279, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Paul R. Milgrom, 1981.
"Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications,"
Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
- Paul R. Milgrom, 1979. "Good Nevs and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Discussion Papers 407R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1975.
"The Theory of "Screening," Education, and the Distribution of Income,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 283-300, June.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1973. "The Theory of 'Screening', Education, and the Distribution of Income," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 354, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- William Chan & Li Hao & Wing Suen, 2007.
"A Signaling Theory Of Grade Inflation,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 1065-1090, August.
- William Chan & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2005. "A Signaling Theory of Grade Inflation," Working Papers tecipa-222, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Heski Bar-Isaac, 2003. "Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(2), pages 231-251.
- Jingyi Cui & Gabriel Dias & Justin Ye, 2025. "Signaling in the Age of AI: Evidence from Cover Letters," Papers 2509.25054, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2025.
- W. Robert J. Alexander & Raffaella Belloni, 2024. "Artificial Intelligence and the Sustainability of the Signaling and Human Capital Roles of Higher Education," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(20), pages 1-18, October.
- Otto Kässi & Vili Lehdonvirta, 2024. "Do Microcredentials Help New Workers Enter the Market? Evidence from an Online Labor Platform," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 59(4), pages 1284-1318.
- Kelly Bedard, 2001.
"Human Capital versus Signaling Models: University Access and High School Dropouts,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(4), pages 749-775, August.
- Kelly Bedard, "undated". "Human Capital Versus Signaling Models: University Access and High School Drop-outs," Canadian International Labour Network Working Papers 19, McMaster University.
- Ursula Mello, 2022. "Centralized Admissions, Affirmative Action, and Access of Low-Income Students to Higher Education," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 166-197, August.
- Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Prat, Julien, 2012.
"Job market signaling and employer learning,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1787-1817.
- Julien Prat & Carlos Alos-Ferrer, 2007. "Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning," 2007 Meeting Papers 648, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Prat, Julien, 2008. "Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning," IZA Discussion Papers 3285, IZA Network @ LISER.
- Anais Galdin & Jesse Silbert, 2025. "Making Talk Cheap: Generative AI and Labor Market Signaling," Papers 2511.08785, arXiv.org.
- George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
- Amanda Pallais, 2014. "Inefficient Hiring in Entry-Level Labor Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(11), pages 3565-3599, November.
- Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Waldman, Michael, 2016. "The dual avenues of labor market signaling," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 120-134.
- Theodore Koutmeridis, 2013.
"The Market for "Rough Diamonds": Information, Finance and Wage Inequality,"
CDMA Working Paper Series
201307, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis, revised 14 Oct 2013.
- Theodore Koutmeridis, 2013. "The Market for "Rough Diamonds": Information, Finance and Wage Inequality," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 201307, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews, revised 14 Oct 2013.
- Theodore, Koutmeridis, 2013. "The Market for "Rough Diamonds": Information, Finance and Wage Inequality," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-32, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Daley, Brendan & Green, Brett, 2014. "Market signaling with grades," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 114-145.
- Ivan Anic & Vladimir Bozin & Branko Uroševic, 2016. "A Signaling Model of University Selection," CESifo Working Paper Series 5741, CESifo.
- Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman, 2012.
"The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence,"
Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 91-147.
- DeVaro, Jed & Waldman, Michael, 2006. "The signaling role of promotions: Further theory and empirical evidence," MPRA Paper 1550, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ekmekci, Mehmet & Kos, Nenad, 2023. "Signaling covertly acquired information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
- Manuel Adelino & Kristopher Gerardi & Barney Hartman-Glaser, 2016.
"Are Lemons Sold First? Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market,"
FRB Atlanta Working Paper
2016-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Manuel Adelino & Kristopher Gerardi & Barney Hartman-Glaser, 2018. "Are Lemons Sold First? Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market," NBER Working Papers 24180, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chris Bidner, 2014.
"A spillover-based theory of credentialism,"
Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1387-1425, November.
- Chris Bidner, 2014. "A spillover‐based theory of credentialism," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(4), pages 1387-1425, November.
- Chris Bidner, 2010. "A Spillover-Based Theory of Credentialism," Discussion Papers 2010-10, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Helmut Bester & Matthias Lang & Jianpei Li, 2021.
"Signaling versus Auditing,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(4), pages 859-883, December.
- Helmut Bester & Matthias Lang & Jianpei Li, 2018. "Signaling versus Auditing," CESifo Working Paper Series 7183, CESifo.
- Bester, Helmut & Lang, Matthias & Li, Jianpei, 2021. "Signaling versus Auditing," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 286, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Nakabayashi, Masaki, 2011.
"Schooling, employer learning, and internal labor market effect: Wage dynamics and human capital investment in the Japanese steel industry, 1930-1960s,"
MPRA Paper
30749, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 May 2011.
- Nakabayashi, Masaki, 2011. "Schooling, employer learning, and internal labor market effect: Wage dynamics and human capital investment in the Japanese steel industry, 1930-1960s," MPRA Paper 30597, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Brendan Daley & Brett Green, 2012. "Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1433-1504, July.
- Xin Jin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Not Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 0314, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
- Habermalz, Steffen, 2003. "Job Matching and the Returns to Educational Signals," IZA Discussion Papers 726, IZA Network @ LISER.
- Bester, Helmut & Lang, Matthias & Li, Jianpei, 2018. "Signaling versus costly information acquisition," Discussion Papers 2018/11, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Daniel Broxterman & Tingyu Zhou, 2023.
"Correction to: Information Frictions in Real Estate Markets: Recent Evidence and Issues,"
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 299-299, February.
- Daniel Broxterman & Tingyu Zhou, 2023. "Information Frictions in Real Estate Markets: Recent Evidence and Issues," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 203-298, February.
- Kjell Hausken, 2006. "A General Equilibrium Model of Signaling and Exchange," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000001035, David K. Levine.
- Wang, Jun & Li, Bo, 2020. "Does employer learning with statistical discrimination exist in China? Evidence from Chinese Micro Survey Data," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 319-333.
- Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Prat, Julien, 2012.
"Job market signaling and employer learning,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1787-1817.
- Julien Prat & Carlos Alos-Ferrer, 2007. "Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning," 2007 Meeting Papers 648, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Prat, Julien, 2008. "Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning," IZA Discussion Papers 3285, IZA Network @ LISER.
- NAKABAYASHI, Masaki, 2011. "Acquired Skills and Learned Abilities: Wage Dynamics of Blue-collar Workers in Internal Labor Markets," ISS Discussion Paper Series (series F) f153, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, revised Apr 2012.
- Adelino, Manuel & Gerardi, Kristopher & Hartman-Glaser, Barney, 2019. "Are lemons sold first? Dynamic signaling in the mortgage market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 1-25.
More about this item
Keywords
; ; ; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- I26 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Returns to Education
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:130011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/130011.html