Fiscal Federalism and Competitive Bidding for Foreign Investment as a Multistage Game
This paper models the behavior of states in a federal country wising to attract foreign firms to locate within their own individual jurisdictions. The essential intertemporal character of this decision is modeled as a multi-stage game to attract such foreign investment in these states. It is found that, when states with unequal political or economic infrastructure compete, the resulting Nash equilibrium profiles are inefficient. Under certain conditions, states that have won once, can â€œallowâ€ a rival to win in a subsequent stage. The resulting Nash Equilibrium is more efficient. If the option of â€œallowingâ€ a rival to win is not available, then states may resort to â€œsuicideâ€ strategies defined as outcomes created by history of losses.
|Date of creation:||2013|
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