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Federalism, weak institutions and the competition for foreign direct investment

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  • Kessing, Sebastian G.
  • Konrad, Kai A.
  • Kotsogiannis, Christos

Abstract

This paper shows that vertical fiscal inefficiencies impede federally organized countries in successfully attracting foreign direct investment. Such countries, particularly if characterized by weak institutions, are disadvantaged in the process of bidding for firms and in their ability to commit to a low overall tax burden. The interaction of these problems deteriorates their competitive position vis-à-vis unitary states in the competition for foreign direct investment. These theoretical considerations are in line with recent empirical evidence that suggests that the number of government layers of host countries has significant and sizeable negative effects on the amount of foreign direct investment inflows. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

Suggested Citation

  • Kessing, Sebastian G. & Konrad, Kai A. & Kotsogiannis, Christos, 2009. "Federalism, weak institutions and the competition for foreign direct investment," Munich Reprints in Economics 22086, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:22086
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    Cited by:

    1. Kessing, Sebastian G. & Konrad, Kai A. & Kotsogiannis, Christos, 2006. "Federal tax autonomy and the limits of cooperation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 317-329, March.
    2. Konrad, Kai A. & Kovenock, Dan, 2009. "Competition for FDI with vintage investment and agglomeration advantages," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 230-237, November.
    3. Carsten Hefeker & Sebastian G. Kessing, 2017. "Competition for natural resources and the hold-up problem," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 50(3), pages 871-888, August.
    4. Ferdinand Mittermaier, 2007. "Subsidy competition and the role of firm ownership," Working Papers 032, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    5. Monica Escaleras & Charles Register, 2012. "Fiscal decentralization and natural hazard risks," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 165-183, April.
    6. Dandan Wu & Wei Dong, 2022. "Does Local Government’s Competitive Behavior to Attract Foreign Investment Affect Ecological Welfare Performance? Evidence from China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(19), pages 1-24, October.
    7. Raghbendra Jha & Hari K. Nagarajan & Kolumum R. Nagarajan, 2013. "Fiscal Federalism and Competitive Bidding for Foreign Investment as a Multistage Game," Departmental Working Papers 2013-04, The Australian National University, Arndt-Corden Department of Economics.
    8. Libman, Alexander, 2008. "Federalism and regionalism in transition countries: A survey," MPRA Paper 29196, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Konrad, Kai A. & Kovenock, Dan, 2009. "Competition for FDI with vintage investment and agglomeration advantages," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 230-237, November.
    10. Becker, Johannes & Davies, Ronald B. & Jakobs, Gitte, 2017. "The economics of advance pricing agreements," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 255-268.
    11. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Olsen, Trond E. & Straume, Odd Rune, 2006. "Cross border mergers and strategic trade policy with two-part taxation: is international policy coordination beneficial? [Grenzüberschreitende Fusionen und strategische Handelspolitik mit zweiseiti," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2006-24, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    12. Geys, Benny & Konrad, Kai A., . "Federalism and optimal allocation across levels of governance," Chapters in Economics,, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    13. Baskaran, Thushyanthan & Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana, 2013. "The economics and empirics of tax competition: A survey," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 163, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    14. Johannes Becker & Michael Kriebel, 2017. "Fiscal equalisation schemes under competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(5), pages 800-816, September.
    15. Michael Keen & Kai A. Konrad, 2012. "International Tax Competition and Coordination," Working Papers international_tax_competi, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    16. Axel Dreher, 2006. "Power to the People? The Impact of Decentralization on Governance," KOF Working papers 06-121, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
    17. Taiji Furusawa & Kazumi Hori & Ian Wooton, 2015. "A race beyond the bottom: the nature of bidding for a firm," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(3), pages 452-475, June.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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