Innovation Races with the Possibility of Failure
The standard innovation race specification assumes a memoryless exponential distribution for the time to success of an R&D project. This specification implies that a project succeeds, eventually, with probability one. We introduce a positive probability that an R&D project fails. With this modified specification, we compare the non-cooperative and cooperative R&D in terms of innovation effort, consumer surplus, and net social welfare.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2011|
|Date of revision:||Aug 2011|
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