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Managers' Productivity and Recruitment in the Public Sector: The Case of School Principals

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  • Muñoz, Pablo
  • Prem, Mounu

Abstract

We study whether differences in management can explain variation in productivity and how more effective managers can be recruited in absence of high-powered incentives. To investigate this, we first extend the canonical teacher value-added model to account for school principals, and we document substantial variation in their ability to improve students' learning. Teachers' survey responses and quasi-experimental designs based on changes in school management validate our measure of principal effectiveness. Then, we leverage the timing of adoption of a civil service reform and show that despite having relatively rigid wages, public schools were able to attract more effective managers after increasing the competitiveness and transparency of their personnel selection process.

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  • Muñoz, Pablo & Prem, Mounu, 2021. "Managers' Productivity and Recruitment in the Public Sector: The Case of School Principals," SocArXiv 7zn2b, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:7zn2b
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/7zn2b
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    Cited by:

    1. Bazzi,Samuel & Hilmy,Masyhur & Marx,Benjamin & Mahvish Ifrah Shaukat & Stegmann,Andreas, 2024. "It Takes a Village Election : Turnover and Performance in Local Bureaucracies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 10920, The World Bank.
    2. Bruna Borges & Gabriel Leite & Ricardo Madeira & Luis Meloni, 2024. "Evaluating the impact of a principals' professional development program on school management practices: Evidence from Brazil," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2024_03, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I25 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Economic Development
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures

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