If future generations had a say: An experiment on fair sharing of a common-pool resource across generations

Through an online experiment with 682 participants, we test how inter-generational resource sharing is affected by granting veto power to later generations. We specifically study the over-use of a common-pool resource (CPR) by early generations at the expense of later generations and examine how the veto empowerment of later generations can be used to restrain egoistic tendencies. We compare sequential ultimatum and dictator games of various lengths and find that (1) the CPR consumption of early generations does not depend on the number of generations that follow them; (2) the veto empowerment of later generations leads to a fairer, but ultimately less efficient use of the CPR across generations; and (3) the vetoes are used more carefully if not only previous generations, but also future generations that do not yet have access to the resource are affected by the veto.