IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/oec/stiaaa/2009-8-en.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Pre-Emptive Patenting: Securing Market Exclusion and Freedom of Operation

Author

Listed:
  • Dominique Guellec

    (OECD)

  • Catalina Martinez

    (Institute of Public Goods and Policies (IPP-CSIC))

  • Maria Pluvia Zuniga

Abstract

We investigate statistically the characteristics, functioning and incidence of pre-emptive patenting, defined as patent filings whose main effect is to hamper the grant of other patents. Patent applications can be used to prevent the grant of exclusive rights on markets and technologies to others in order to ensure freedom of operation to their holder or keep patent-less competitors out of the market. Combining data from examination outcomes and prior art at the European Patent Office (EPO), we develop a methodology to identify pre-emptive patent applications. We find evidence of pre-emption associated to patent applications cited as compromising patentability while being deemed non inventive. Furthermore, amongst them, those which are withdrawn by the applicant have the strongest pre-emptive power. The coincidence of low inventiveness and high pre-emptive impact supports the idea that some of these patents may be strategically designed by their applicants to block patenting by others. Nous analysons statistiquement les caractéristiques, le fonctionnement et les effets des brevets préemptifs, définis comme des (demandes de) brevets dont l’effet principal est d’empêcher la délivrance d’autres brevets. Les demandes de brevets peuvent être utilisées pour empêcher la délivrance de droits exclusifs à d’autres parties sur des marchés et des technologies en vue d’assurer la liberté de manœuvre à leur titulaire ou de maintenir des compétiteurs sans brevets à l’écart du marché. Combinant des données du résultat de l’examen et de l’art antérieur de l’Office Européen des Brevets (OEB), nous développons une méthodologie qui identifie les demandes préemptives de brevets. Nous trouvons des évidences de préemption pour des demandes de brevets citées comme compromettant la brevetabilité d’autres demandes alors qu’elles ne sont pas elles-mêmes jugés inventives. De plus parmi elles, celles qui sont abandonnées par le demandeur lui-même ont le pouvoir préemptif le plus fort. La coïncidence de faible inventivité et de pouvoir préemptif fort suggère que certaines de ces demandes de brevets sont stratégiquement conçues par leur titulaire en vue de bloquer la prise de brevet par d’autres.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Guellec & Catalina Martinez & Maria Pluvia Zuniga, 2009. "Pre-Emptive Patenting: Securing Market Exclusion and Freedom of Operation," OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers 2009/8, OECD Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:oec:stiaaa:2009/8-en
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/218405082642
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eric J. Iversen & Aris Kaloudis, 2006. "IP-Valuation as a Tool to Sustain Innovation," Chapters,in: The Management of Intellectual Property, chapter 13 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Balsmeier, Benjamin & Buchwald, Achim & Stiebale, Joel, 2014. "Outside directors on the board and innovative firm performance," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(10), pages 1800-1815.
    2. Malva, Antonio Della & Hussinger, Katrin, 2012. "Corporate science in the patent system: An analysis of the semiconductor technology," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 118-135.
    3. repec:bla:jinfst:v:68:y:2017:i:6:p:1360-1374 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Grimpe, Christoph & Hussinger, Katrin, 2014. "Pre-empted patents, infringed patents and firms’ participation in markets for technology," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 543-554.
    5. Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Hélène Dernis & Geert Boedt, 2014. "An Introduction to the Patstat Database with Example Queries," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 47(3), pages 395-408, September.
    6. Christian Bjørnskov & Niklas Potrafke, 2012. "Political Ideology and Economic Freedom Across Canadian Provinces," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 38(2), pages 143-166.
    7. Christian Le Bas & Julien Pénin, 2014. "Patents and innovation : Are the brakes broken, or how to restore patents’ dynamic efficiency ?," Working Papers of BETA 2014-02, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    8. Christoph Grimpe & Katrin Hussinger, 2014. "Resource complementarity and value capture in firm acquisitions: The role of intellectual property rights," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(12), pages 1762-1780, December.
    9. Adam B. Jaffe & Gaétan de Rassenfosse, 2017. "Patent citation data in social science research: Overview and best practices," Journal of the Association for Information Science & Technology, Association for Information Science & Technology, vol. 68(6), pages 1360-1374, June.
    10. Chen, Yi-Min & Liu, Hsin-Hsien & Liu, Yu-Siang & Huang, Huei-Ting, 2016. "A preemptive power to offensive patent litigation strategy: Value creation, transaction costs and organizational slack," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(5), pages 1634-1638.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    blocking patents; citations; offensive and defensive patenting; patents; pre-emptive patenting;

    JEL classification:

    • C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities
    • C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • L00 - Industrial Organization - - General - - - General
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oec:stiaaa:2009/8-en. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/scoecfr.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.