Modeling the Duration of Patent Examination at the European Patent Office
We analyze the duration of the patent examination process at the European Patent Office (EPO). Our data contain information related to the patentâ€™s economic and technical relevance, EPO capacity and workload as well as novel citation measures which are derived from the EPOâ€™s search reports. In our multivariate analysis we estimate competing risk specifications in order to characterize differences in the processes leading to a withdrawal of the application by the applicant, a refusal of the patent grant by the examiner or an actual patent grant. Highly cited applications are approved faster by the EPO than less important ones, but they are also withdrawn less quickly by the applicant. The process duration increases for all outcomes with the applicationâ€™s complexity, originality, number of references (backward citations) in the search report and with the EPOâ€™s workload at the filing date. Endogenous applicant behavior becomes apparent in other results: more controversial claims lead to slower grants, but faster withdrawals, while relatively well-documented applications (identified by a high share of applicant references appearing in the search report) are approved faster and take longer to be withdrawn.
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- Régibeau, Pierre & Rockett, Katharine, 2007.
"Are More Important Patents Approved More Slowly and Should They Be?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6178, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- RÃ©gibeau, Pierre & Rockett, Katharine, 2003. "Are More Important Patents Approved More Slowly and Should They Be?," Economics Discussion Papers 2850, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- David Popp & Ted Juhl & Daniel K.N. Johnson, 2003. "Time in Purgatory: Determinants of the Grant Lag for U.S. Patent Applications," NBER Working Papers 9518, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Manuel Trajtenberg & Rebecca Henderson & Adam Jaffe, 1997. "University Versus Corporate Patents: A Window On The Basicness Of Invention," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(1), pages 19-50.
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