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Pre-empted patents, infringed patents and firms’ participation in markets for technology

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  • Grimpe, Christoph
  • Hussinger, Katrin

Abstract

In recent years, firms have increasingly contributed to and been confronted with a patent landscape characterized by numerous but marginal inventions, overlapping claims and patent fences. As a result, firms risk their patent applications to be pre-empted or to be infringed upon by rivals. While both aspects constitute major challenges for the appropriation of returns to inventive activity, extant literature suggests that participation in the market for technology might actually resolve or at least alleviate these problems. In this paper, we investigate the effect of pre-empted and infringed patents on firms’ engagement in in- and cross-licensing. Based on a sample of more than 1100 German manufacturing firms our results show that firms engage in in-licensing as a reaction to pre-empted patents and in cross-licensing if their protected IP was infringed upon. However, these effects vary depending on the fragmentation of technology fields and whether the firm operates in a discrete or complex product industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Grimpe, Christoph & Hussinger, Katrin, 2014. "Pre-empted patents, infringed patents and firms’ participation in markets for technology," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 543-554.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:respol:v:43:y:2014:i:3:p:543-554
    DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2013.12.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chondrakis, George, 2016. "Unique synergies in technology acquisitions," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1873-1889.
    2. Dirk Czarnitzki & Katrin Hussinger & Cédric Schneider, 2015. "R&D Collaboration with Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(2), pages 183-204, March.
    3. Buss, Philipp & Peukert, Christian, 2015. "R&D outsourcing and intellectual property infringement," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(4), pages 977-989.
    4. Brem, Alexander & Nylund, Petra A. & Schuster, Gerd, 2016. "Innovation and de facto standardization: The influence of dominant design on innovative performance, radical innovation, and process innovation," Technovation, Elsevier, vol. 50, pages 79-88.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    In-licensing; Cross-licensing; Pre-emption; Infringement;

    JEL classification:

    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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