Pre-empting Technology Competition Through Firm Acquisitions
This paper investigates the motive of pre-empting technology competition through mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Exploiting the patent application procedure at the European Patent Office we introduce a new measure for the possibility to create entry barriers in technology markets. Our results show significant evidence that firms engage in horizontal M&A to pre-empt competition in technology markets.
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