The Settlement of Patent Litigation
In this article I develop a model to analyze patent licensing that is induced as part of a settlement agreement to avoid litigation of the issue of patent validity. The patentee possesses private information about patent validity and makes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer to a single potential rival. An essentially unique sequential equilibrium exists if out-of-equilibrium beliefs are restricted appropriately. The model analyzes the effect of the probability of settlement and litigation.
Volume (Year): 20 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.rje.org|
|Order Information:||Web: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:20:y:1989:i:spring:p:77-91. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.