Jostling for Advantage: Licensing and Entry into Patent Portfolio Races
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- Siebert, Ralph & Graevenitz, Georg von, 2006. "Jostling for Advantage: Licensing and Entry into Patent Portfolio Races," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 184, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Carl Shapiro, 2003. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting," Law and Economics 0303005, EconWPA.
- Carl Shapiro, 2004. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standard Setting," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000539, David K. Levine.
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- Siebert, Ralph & von Graevenitz, Georg, 2006.
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CEPR Discussion Papers
5436, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Siebert, Ralph & Graevenitz, Georg von, 2006. "How Licensing Resolves Hold-Up: Evidence from a Dynamic Panel Data Model with Unobserved Heterogeneity," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 105, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Dirk Czarnitzki & Katrin Hussinger & Cédric Schneider, 2015.
"R&D Collaboration with Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights,"
Review of Industrial Organization,
Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(2), pages 183-204, March.
- Czarnitzki, Dirk & Hussinger, Katrin & Schneider, Cédric, 2011. "R&D collaboration with uncertain intellectual property rights," ZEW Discussion Papers 11-010, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Beschorner, Patrick Frank Ernst, 2008. "Do Shorter Product Cycles Induce Patent Thickets?," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-098, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Grimpe, Christoph & Hussinger, Katrin, 2014. "Pre-empted patents, infringed patents and firms’ participation in markets for technology," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 543-554.
- Stefano Comino & ?Fabio Manenti & ?Antonio Nicol•, 2007. "Sequential innovations with unobservable follow-on investments," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0041, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
More about this item
Keywordshold-up problem; innovation; licensing; patent race; patent thicket; research joint ventures;
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L49 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Other
- L63 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Microelectronics; Computers; Communications Equipment
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-10-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-INO-2006-10-28 (Innovation)
- NEP-MIC-2006-10-28 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-TID-2006-10-28 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
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