Fragmented property rights and R&D competition
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordsfragmented property rights; patents; contests; hold-up; R&D; patent pools; licensing;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-06-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2006-06-17 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2006-06-17 (Innovation)
- NEP-MIC-2006-06-17 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-TID-2006-06-17 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
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