Foundations of Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics. Existence, Purification, and Multiplicity
In this paper we show that existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model of dynamic competition in an oligopolistic industry with investment, entry, and exit requires admissibility of mixed entry/exit strategies, con- trary to Ericson & Pakes's (1995) assertion. This is problematic because the existing algorithms cannot cope with mixed strategies. To establish a firm basis for computing dynamic industry equilibria, we introduce ¯rm heterogeneity in the form of randomly drawn, privately known scrap values and setup costs into the model. We show that the resulting game of incomplete information always has a MPE in cuto® entry/exit strate- gies and is computationally no more demanding than the original game of complete information. Building on our basic existence result, we first show that a symmetric and anonymous MPE exists under appropriate assumptions on the model's primitives. Sec- ond, we show that, as the distribution of the random scrap values/setup costs becomes degenerate, MPEs in cuto® entry/exit strategies converge to MPEs in mixed entry/exit strategies of the game of complete information. Next, we provide a condition on the model's primitives that ensures the existence of a MPE in pure investment strategies. Finally, we provide the first example of multiple symmetric and anonymous MPEs in this literature.
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