Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Applied Work
We present a framework for the applied analysis of dynamic games with asymmetric information. The framework consists of a definition of equilibrium, and an algorithm to compute it. Our definition of Applied Markov Perfect equilibrium is an extension of the definition of Markov Perfect equilibrium for games with asymmetric information; an extension chosen for its usefulness to applied research. Each agent conditions its strategy on the payoff or informationally relevant variables that are observed by that particular agent. The strategies are optimal given the beliefs on the evolution of these observed variables, and the rules governing the evolution of the observables are consistent with the equilibrium strategies. We then provide a simple algorithm for computing this equilibrium. The algorithm is easy to program and does not require computation of posterior distributions, explicit integration over possible future states, or information from all possible points in the state space. For specificity, we present our results in the context of a dynamic oligopoly game with collusion in which the outcome of firms’ investments are random and only observed by the investing agent. We then use this example to illustrate the computational properties of the algorithm.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.|
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|Order Information:|| Email: |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ariel Pakes & Michael Ostrovsky & Steve Berry, 2004.
"Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Examples),"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
2036, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Ariel Pakes & Michael Ostrovsky & Steven Berry, 2007. "Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete dynamic games (with entry/exit examples)," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 373-399, 06.
- Ariel Pakes & Michael Ostrovsky & Steve Berry, 2004. "Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Samples)," NBER Working Papers 10506, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Frank A. Wolak & Robert H. Patrick, 2001. "The Impact of Market Rules and Market Structure on the Price Determination Process in the England and Wales Electricity Market," NBER Working Papers 8248, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Paul Ellickson & Beresteanu Arie, 2005. "The Dynamics of Retail Oligopolies," 2005 Meeting Papers 829, Society for Economic Dynamics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5024. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.