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Complementary Bidding Mechanisms and Startup Costs in Electricity Markets

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  • Mar Reguant

Abstract

I extend multi-unit auction estimation techniques to a setting in which firms can express cost complementarities over time. In the context of electricity markets, I show how the auction structure and bidding data can be used to estimate these complementarities, which in these markets arise due to startup costs. I find that startup costs are substantial and that taking them into account helps better explain firm bidding strategies and production patterns. As in other dynamic settings, I find that startup costs limit the ability of firms to change production over time, exacerbating fluctuations in market prices. These fluctuations can induce estimates of market power that ignore dynamic costs to overstate markup volatility, with predicted markups that can be even negative in periods of low demand. I show how accounting for startup costs can provide a natural correction for these markup biases.

Suggested Citation

  • Mar Reguant, 2014. "Complementary Bidding Mechanisms and Startup Costs in Electricity Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 4811, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4811
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Erin T. Mansur, 2008. "Measuring Welfare in Restructured Electricity Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 90(2), pages 369-386, May.
    2. McAdams, David, 2008. "Partial identification and testable restrictions in multi-unit auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 74-85, September.
    3. Pakes, Ariel & Pollard, David, 1989. "Simulation and the Asymptotics of Optimization Estimators," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(5), pages 1027-1057, September.
    4. Ali Hortaçsu & Steven L. Puller, 2008. "Understanding strategic bidding in multi-unit auctions: a case study of the Texas electricity spot market," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 86-114.
    5. James T. E. Chapman & David McAdams & Harry J. Paarsch, 2007. "Bounding Revenue Comparisons across Multi-Unit Auction Formats under ε-Best Response," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 455-458, May.
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    7. Jakub Kastl, 2011. "Discrete Bids and Empirical Inference in Divisible Good Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(3), pages 974-1014.
    8. Ali Hortaçsu & David McAdams, 2010. "Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Good Auctions: An Empirical Analysis of the Turkish Treasury Auction Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(5), pages 833-865.
    9. Kastl, Jakub, 2012. "On the properties of equilibria in private value divisible good auctions with constrained bidding," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 339-352.
    10. Kühn, Kai-Uwe & Machado, Matilde Pinto, 2004. "Bilateral Market Power and Vertical Integration in the Spanish Electricity Spot Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 4590, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Natalia Fabra & Mar Reguant, 2014. "Pass-Through of Emissions Costs in Electricity Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(9), pages 2872-2899, September.
    2. Donna, Javier & Espin-Sanchez, Jose, 2014. "Complements and Substitutes in Sequential Auctions: The Case of Water Auctions," MPRA Paper 55079, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Koichiro Ito & Mar Reguant, 2016. "Sequential Markets, Market Power, and Arbitrage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(7), pages 1921-1957, July.
    4. Werner, Dan, 2014. "Electricity Market Price Volatility: The Importance of Ramping Costs," 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota 169619, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    5. Matti Liski & Iivo Vehviläinen, 2016. "Gone with the Wind? An Empirical Analysis of the Renewable Energy Rent Transfer," CESifo Working Paper Series 6250, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. Nicholas Ryan, 2017. "The Competitive Effects of Transmission Infrastructure in the Indian Electricity Market," NBER Working Papers 23106, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Steve Cicala, 2017. "Imperfect Markets versus Imperfect Regulation in U.S. Electricity Generation," NBER Working Papers 23053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Jorge Balat & Juan E. Carranza & Juan D. Martin, 2015. "Dynamic and Strategic Behavior in Hydropower-Dominated Electricity Markets: Empirical Evidence for Colombia," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 012906, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
    9. Victor Chernozhukov & Whitney K. Newey & Andres Santos, 2015. "Constrained conditional moment restriction models," CeMMAP working papers CWP59/15, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    10. Brown, David P. & Eckert, Andrew & Eckert, Heather, 2017. "Carbon Pricing with an Output Subsidy under Imperfect Competition: The Case of Alberta's Restructured Electricity Market," Working Papers 2017-1, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
    11. Brown, David P. & Eckert, Andrew, 2016. "Analyzing the Impact of Electricity Market Structure Changes and Mergers: The Importance of Forward Commitments," Working Papers 2016-8, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
    12. Levi Marks & Charles F. Mason & Kristina Mohlin & Matthew Zaragoza-Watkins, 2017. "Vertical Market Power in Interconnected Natural Gas and Electricity Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 6687, CESifo Group Munich.
    13. Lundin, Erik, 2016. "Market Power and Joint Ownership: Evidence from Nuclear Plants in Sweden," Working Paper Series 1113, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    14. Ciarreta, Aitor & Espinosa, Maria Paz & Pizarro-Irizar, Cristina, 2017. "Has renewable energy induced competitive behavior in the Spanish electricity market?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 171-182.
    15. repec:kap:revind:v:52:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s11151-017-9580-1 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Eric Budish & Judd B. Kessler, 2016. "Can Agents “Report Their Types”? An Experiment that Changed the Course Allocation Mechanism at Wharton," NBER Working Papers 22448, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Gautam Gowrisankaran & Stanley S. Reynolds & Mario Samano, 2016. "Intermittency and the Value of Renewable Energy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(4), pages 1187-1234.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    auctions with complementarities; electricity markets; startup costs; market power;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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