Good Donors or Good Recipients? A Repeated Moral Hazard Model of Aid Allocation
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Joshua C. Hall & Serkan Karadas & Minh Tam T. Schlosky, 2016. "Is There Moral Hazard in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative Debt Relief Process?," Working Papers 16-24, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
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KeywordsForeign Aid; Conditionality; Moral Hazard;
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