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Slippery Fish: Enforcing Regulation when Agents Learn and Adapt

Author

Listed:
  • Andres Gonzalez-Lira
  • Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak

Abstract

Attempts to curb undesired behavior through regulation gets complicated when agents can adapt to circumvent enforcement. We test a model of enforcement with learning and adaptation, by auditing vendors selling illegal fish in Chile in a randomized controlled trial, and tracking them daily using mystery shoppers. Conducting audits on a predictable schedule and (counter-intuitively) at high frequency is less effective, as agents learn to take advantage of loopholes. A consumer information campaign proves to be almost as cost-effective and curbing illegal sales, and obviates the need for complex monitoring and policing. The Chilean government subsequently chooses to scale up this campaign.

Suggested Citation

  • Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak, 2021. "Slippery Fish: Enforcing Regulation when Agents Learn and Adapt," NBER Working Papers 28610, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28610
    Note: DEV EEE LE POL
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    Cited by:

    1. Kastoryano, Stephen & Vollaard, Ben, 2022. "Nautical Patrol and Illegal Fishing Practices," Discussion Paper 2022-016, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Naritomi, Joana & Nyamdavaa, Tsogsag & Campbell, Stephanie, 2025. "Enlisting consumers in tax enforcement: a policy review," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 127223, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Kastoryano, Stephen & Vollaard, Ben, 2023. "Unseen annihilation: Illegal fishing practices and nautical patrol," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    4. João Pedro Vieira & Ricardo Dahis & Juliano Assunção, 2023. "The Role of Sanctions and Spillovers in Forest Conservation," Monash Economics Working Papers 2023-16, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    5. repec:ags:aaea22:335618 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Liang, Yuanning, 2023. "Do Safety Inspections Improve Safety? Evidence from the Roadside Inspection Program for Commercial Vehicles," 2023 Annual Meeting, July 23-25, Washington D.C. 335618, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    7. Vieira, João Pedro & Dahis, Ricardo & Assunção, Juliano, 2023. "From Deforestation to Reforestation: The Role of General Deterrence in Changing Farmers' Behavior," SocArXiv vqpkm, Center for Open Science.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

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