How Does the Government (Want to) Fund Science? Politics, Lobbying and Academic Earmarks
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- de Figueiredo, John & Silverman, Brian, 2004. "How Does the Government (Want to) Fund Science? Politics, Lobbying and Academic Earmarks," Working papers 4484-04, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
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More about this item
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-EDU-2007-10-20 (Education)
- NEP-IPR-2007-10-20 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-PBE-2007-10-20 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2007-10-20 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SOG-2007-10-20 (Sociology of Economics)
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