A Competitive Theory of Monopoly Unionism
This paper sets up a microeconomic theory of labor unions. It discusses their formation and goals, their hierarchical structure, and the nature of rent distribution. The theory provides predictions for the probability that an industry or occupation will be unionized, the proportion of that industry that will be unionized, and observed wage differentials within that industry. It discusses the way that those values change in response to changes in the supply of labor, demand for labor, cost of organizing the union, and cost of defeating the union. Institutions such as featherbedding, fringe benefits, and seniority are rationalized in this framework. The model is consistent with competitive factor and product markets.
|Date of creation:||May 1981|
|Publication status:||published as Lazear, Edward P. "A Competitive Theory of Monopoly Unionism." The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 4. (September 1983) pp. 631-643. Journal ofterature, Vol. 22, No. 1, (March 1984) Abstract only, p. 479.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
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- Harry G. Johnson & Peter Mieszkowski, 1970. "The Effects of Unionization on the Distribution of Income: A General Equilibrium Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(4), pages 539-561.
- Freeman, Richard B, 1976. "Individual Mobility and Union Voice in the Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 361-368, May.
- Diewert, W E, 1974. "The Effects of Unionization on Wages and Employment: A General Equilibrium Analysis," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 12(3), pages 319-339, September.
- Carl M. Stevens, 1958. "On the Theory of Negotiation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(1), pages 77-97.
- James N. Dertouzos & John H. Pencavel, 1980. "Wage and Employment Determinants under Trade Unionism: The InternationalTypographical Union," NBER Working Papers 0570, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert E. Hall & David M. Lilien, 1978.
"Efficient Wage Bargains Under Uncertain Supply and Demand,"
NBER Working Papers
0306, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hall, Robert E & Lilien, David M, 1979. "Efficient Wage Bargains under Uncertain Supply and Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 868-879, December.
- Crawford, Vincent P, 1979. "On Compulsory-Arbitration Schemes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(1), pages 131-159, February.
- S. Rosen, 1969. "Trade Union Power, Threat Effects and the Extent of Organization," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(2), pages 185-196.
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