The Economics of Wage Floors
This paper contains a theoretical analysis of and summaries of empirical information on consequences of wage floors in the labor market imposed by minimum wages and by labor unions. Excess supplies are rationed in part probabilistically ("first come, first served"), and in part systematically -- by raising hiring standards, or by discrimination and nepotism. Effects on employment, unemployment, and labor force participation, and on wage differentials between the II covered'' and the free sector follow. Empirical information on these effects is cited in the minimum wage case, but only wage differentials are analyzed in the union context. Other consequences outlined here are: lengthening of school attendance, reduction of hours of work, substitution of paid out wages for fringes in the minimum wage case. However, union pressure on fringes is greater than on wages. This strategy produces larger income and greater job security for union members. The minimum wage reduces opportunities for job training and consequent wage growth. Quits initially decline as wages are pushed up, but turnover is likely to increase as the training content of jobs is reduced. Union wage and fringe advantages reduce quits significantly. However, training as well as wage growth are reduced.
|Date of creation:||Nov 1981|
|Publication status:||published as Mincer, Jacob. "The Economics of Wage Floors," Research in Labor Economics , Vol. 6, 1984.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Edward M. Gramlich, 1976. "Impact of Minimum Wages on Other Wages, Employment, and Family Incomes," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 7(2), pages 409-462.
- S. Rosen, 1969. "Trade Union Power, Threat Effects and the Extent of Organization," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(2), pages 185-196.
- Duncan, Greg J & Stafford, Frank P, 1980. "Do Union Members Receive Compensating Wage Differentials?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 355-371, June.
- Mellow, Wesley S, 1981. "Unionism and Wages: A Longitudinal Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 63(1), pages 43-52, February.
- Jacob Mincer, 1974.
"Unemployment Effects of Minimum Wages,"
NBER Working Papers
0039, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael L. Wachter & Choongsoo Kim, 1979. "Time Series Changes in Youth Joblessness," NBER Working Papers 0384, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- J. Wilson Mixon Jr., 1978. "The Minimum Wage and Voluntary Labor Mobility," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 32(1), pages 67-73, October.
- Richard B. Freeman, 1978. "The Effect of Trade Unionism on Fringe Benefits," NBER Working Papers 0292, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Wessels, Walter J, 1980. "The Effect of Minimum Wages in the Presence of Fringe Benefits: An Expanded Model," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(2), pages 293-313, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:0804. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.