IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cte/wbrepe/wb020803.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Employer behavior when workers can unionize

Author

Listed:
  • Ruiz-Verdú, Pablo

Abstract

Unionization imposes substantial costs on employers. This paper develops a model that recognizes that, as a result, employers will set wages and employment taking into account the effect of their decisions on workers' incentives to organize. This model of employer behavior allows us to address two questions jointly: What determines which firms become unionized? And what are the consequences of unionization for employment and wages in nonunion firms? The implications of the model depart significantly from those of previous work, which either ignored employers' strategic behavior, or treated these questions in isolation.

Suggested Citation

  • Ruiz-Verdú, Pablo, 2002. "Employer behavior when workers can unionize," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB wb020803, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
  • Handle: RePEc:cte:wbrepe:wb020803
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/bitstream/handle/10016/63/wb020803.pdf?sequence=1
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrews, Martyn J & Bell, David N F & Upward, Richard, 1998. "Union Coverage Differentials. Some Estimates for Britain Using the New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 60(1), pages 47-77, February.
    2. Flanagan, Robert J, 1989. "Compliance and Enforcement Decisions under the National Labor Relations Act," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 7(3), pages 257-280, July.
    3. Duncan, Greg J & Stafford, Frank P, 1980. "Do Union Members Receive Compensating Wage Differentials?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 355-371, June.
    4. Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, 1990. "Employer Behavior in the Face of Union Organizing Drives," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 43(4), pages 351-365, July.
    5. Acemoglu, Daron, 1995. "Asymmetric Information, Bargaining, and Unemployment Fluctuations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(4), pages 1003-1024, November.
    6. Stewart, Mark B, 1991. "Union Wage Differentials in the Face of Changes in the Economic and Legal Environment," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 58(230), pages 155-172, May.
    7. Lazear, Edward P, 1983. "A Competitive Theory of Monopoly Unionism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 631-643, September.
    8. Ruback, Richard S & Zimmerman, Martin B, 1984. "Unionization and Profitability: Evidence from the Capital Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 1134-1157, December.
    9. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1993. "Bargaining with Private Information," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 45-104, March.
    10. Linneman, Peter & Wachter, Michael L, 1986. "Rising Union Premiums and the Declining Boundaries among Noncompeting Groups," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 103-108, May.
    11. David G. Blanchflower, 1997. "Changes Over Time in Union Relative Wage Effects in Great Britain and the United States," NBER Working Papers 6100, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. John M. Abowd & Henry S. Farber, 1990. "Product Market Competition, Union Organizing Activity, and Employer Resistence," NBER Working Papers 3353, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. S. Rosen, 1969. "Trade Union Power, Threat Effects and the Extent of Organization," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(2), pages 185-196.
    14. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D & Maskin, Eric S, 1983. "Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(6), pages 907-928, December.
    15. Richard B. Freeman, 2000. "Single Peaked Vs. Diversified Capitalism: The Relation Between Economic Institutions and Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 7556, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Freeman, Richard B, 1986. "The Effect of the Union Wage Differential on Management Opposition and Union Organizing Success," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 92-96, May.
    17. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    18. Stewart, Mark B, 1995. "Union Wage Differentials in an Era of Declining Unionization," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 57(2), pages 143-166, May.
    19. Barry T. Hirsch & Edward J. Schumacher, 2000. "“Earnings Imputation and Bias in Wage Gap Estimates,”," Working Papers 0003, East Carolina University, Department of Economics.
    20. Barry T. Hirsch, 1991. "Labor Unions and the Economic Performance of Unions," Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number luepf, November.
    21. Lars A. Stole & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 1996. "Intra-firm Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 375-410.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cte:wbrepe:wb020803. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ana Poveda). General contact details of provider: http://www.business.uc3m.es/es/index .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.