Tacit Collusion. The Neglected Experimental Evidence
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- Christoph Engel, 2015. "Tacit Collusion – The Neglected Experimental Evidence," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015_04, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
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More about this item
KeywordsOligopoly; Coordinated Effects; Tacit Collusion; Merger Guidelines; Airtours; Experimental Markets;
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-12-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-12-15 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EXP-2007-12-15 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2007-12-15 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2007-12-15 (Microeconomics)
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