Competition as a Socially Desirable Dilemma. Theory vs. Experimental Evidence
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Christoph Engel, 2011. "Competition as a Socially Desirable Dilemma – Theory v. Experimental Evidence," Chapters,in: Competition Policy and the Economic Approach, chapter 13 Edward Elgar Publishing.
References listed on IDEAS
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999.
"A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., . "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Chapters in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, "undated". "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1999. "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Munich Reprints in Economics 20650, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Carl Davidson & Raymond Deneckere, 1986. "Long-Run Competition in Capacity, Short-Run Competition in Price, and the Cournot Model," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 404-415, Autumn.
- Christoph Engel, 2008. "The Behaviour of Corporate Actors. A Survey of the Empirical Literature," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_23, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Jennifer Zelmer, 2003. "Linear Public Goods Experiments: A Meta-Analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(3), pages 299-310, November.
- Fischbacher, Urs & Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001.
"Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment,"
Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 397-404, June.
- Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter & Ernst Fehr, "undated". "Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment," IEW - Working Papers 016, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
- repec:oup:jcomle:v:3:y:2007:i:4:p:491-549. is not listed on IDEAS
- Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
- Christoph Engel, 2007.
"Tacit Collusion. The Neglected Experimental Evidence,"
Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
2007_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Jan 2015.
- Christoph Engel, 2015. "Tacit Collusion – The Neglected Experimental Evidence," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015_04, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Switgard Feuerstein, 2005. "Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Survey," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 163-198, December.
- Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, March.
- Steffen Huck & Brian Wallace, 2002. "Reciprocal strategies and aspiration levels in a Cournot-Stackelberg experiment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(3), pages 1-7.
- Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2002:i:3:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
- Christoph Engel, 2007.
"How Much Collusion? A Meta-Analysis Of Oligopoly Experiments,"
Journal of Competition Law and Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 3(4), pages 491-549.
- Christoph Engel, 2006. "How Much Collusion. A Meta-Analysis On Oligopoly Experiments," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_27, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Slade, Margaret E., 1990. "Strategic pricing models and interpretation of price-war data," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 524-537, May.
- Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter.
- David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
More about this item
KeywordsCartel; Oligopoly; Bertrand; Cournot; Public Good; Externality; Experiment;
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-04-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2010-04-17 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EXP-2010-04-17 (Experimental Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_24. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marc Martin). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/mppggde.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.