Competition in a Pure World of Internet Telephony
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More about this item
Keywordsproperty right; non-linear pricing; pure bundling; club good; cross-subsidisation; packet switched telephony;
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-01-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-01-23 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ICT-2007-01-23 (Information & Communication Technologies)
- NEP-MIC-2007-01-23 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2007-01-23 (Network Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2007-01-23 (Public Economics)
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