Competition in a Pure World of Internet Telephony
From the angle of competition policy, Voice over IP looks like a panacea. It not only brings better service, but it also increases competitive pressure on former telecommunications monopolists. This paper points to the largely overlooked downside. In a pure world of Internet telephony, there would be no charge for individual calls, nor for telephony, as distinct from other services running over the uniform network. Specifically, establishing property rights for either of these would be costly, whereas these property rights were automatic and free of charge in switched telephony. Giving voice over IP providers classic telephone numbers would enhance systems competition with switched telephony. But this would make it more difficult for clients to swap providers. The anti-competitive caller pays principle would extend to IP telephony.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10 - D- 53113 Bonn|
Phone: +49-(0)228 / 91416-0
Fax: +49-(0)228 / 91416-55
Web page: http://www.coll.mpg.de/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eggertsson,Thrainn, 1990. "Economic Behavior and Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521348911, june. pag.
- Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2003.
"To Bundle or Not to Bundle,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1440, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Beggs, Alan W & Klemperer, Paul, 1992.
"Multi-period Competition with Switching Costs,"
Econometric Society, vol. 60(3), pages 651-66, May.
- Mackie-Mason, J.K. & Varian, H.R., 1993.
"Pricing the Internet,"
20/1993, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Robert W. Helsley & William C. Strange, 1991. "Exclusion and the Theory of Clubs," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 24(4), pages 889-99, November.
- Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2010.
"Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 1-37, November.
- Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2003. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1441R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2006.
- Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2008. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods," NBER Working Papers 13797, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Crew, Michael A & Fernando, Chitru S & Kleindorfer, Paul R, 1995. "The Theory of Peak-Load Pricing: A Survey," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 215-48, November.
- Paul A. David, 2001. "The Evolving Accidental Information Super-Highway," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 159-187, Summer.
- Katz, Michael & E, Benjamin. Hermalin, 2005.
"Sender or Receiver: Who should pay to Exchange an Electronic Messages?,"
Working Paper Series
3812, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, 2004. "Sender or Receiver: Who Should Pay to Exchange an Electronic Message?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 423-447, Autumn.
- Littlechild, S.C., 0. "Mobile termination charges: Calling Party Pays versus Receiving Party Pays," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(5-6), pages 242-277, June.
- Doyle, Chris & Smith, Jennifer C., 1998. "Market structure in mobile telecoms: qualified indirect access and the receiver pays principle," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 471-488, December.
- Scotchmer, Suzanne & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1987. "Competitive equilibrium and the core in club economies with anonymous crowding," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 159-173, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2007_1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marc Martin)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.