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Exclusion and the Theory of Clubs

Author

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  • Robert W. Helsley
  • William C. Strange

Abstract

This paper examines the competitive provision of club goods with costly exclusion. The authors consider two exclusion regimes: fine and coarse. With fine exclusion, a provider can charge both a membership fee and a per use price. With coarse exclusion, a provider can charge a membership fee only. The authors show that competitive club good providers choose both the efficient exclusion regime, which depends on the costs of exclusion, and the associated efficient resource allocation. Thus, with costly exclusion, the competitive provision of club goods is constrained Pareto efficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert W. Helsley & William C. Strange, 1991. "Exclusion and the Theory of Clubs," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 24(4), pages 889-899, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:24:y:1991:i:4:p:889-99
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kurtis J. Swope & Eckhard Janeba, 2005. "Taxes or Fees? The Political Economy of Providing Excludable Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(3), pages 405-426, August.
    2. Yang, Chia-yen, 2000. "The organizational choice of public good provision," ISU General Staff Papers 2000010108000013664, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    3. James G. Mulligan, 2001. "The Pricing of a Round of Golf," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 2(4), pages 328-340, November.
    4. Prüfer, J. & Walz, U., 2009. "How Does the Governance of Academic Faculties Affect Competition Among Them?," Other publications TiSEM f0e504a7-78a7-4315-8517-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Todd Sandler, 2013. "Buchanan clubs," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 265-284, December.
    6. Helsley, Robert W. & Strange, William C., 1998. "Private government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 281-304, June.
    7. Jens Prüfer & Uwe Walz, 2013. "Academic faculty governance and recruitment decisions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 507-529, June.
    8. Engel, Christoph, 0. "Competition in a pure world of Internet telephony," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(8-9), pages 530-540, September.
    9. DeWald, Joshua & Espey, Molly & Hammig, Michael D., 2004. "Implementation of Village Self-Help Projects in the Kyrgyz Republic," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 32(11), pages 1927-1938, November.
    10. Prüfer, J. & Walz, U., 2007. "How does Clubs' Organizational Design Affect Competition Among Clubs?," Discussion Paper 2007-27, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    11. Hideo Konishi, 2010. "Efficient Mixed Clubs: Nonlinear‐Pricing Equilibria With Entrepreneurial Managers," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 35-63, March.
    12. Anuj Bhowmik & Japneet Kaur, 2022. "Competitive equilibria and robust efficiency with club goods," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2022-014, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    13. Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha & Cabrales, Antonio, 2023. "Pricing group membership," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 114-121.
    14. Silva, Emilson C. D., 1997. "A-la-Carte or Smorgasbord? Multiproduct Clubs with Costly Exclusion," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 264-280, March.
    15. John P. Conley & Myrna Wooders, 1998. "Anonymous Lindahl Pricing in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(4), pages 952-974, November.
    16. Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro, 2013. "Voluntary provision of public goods," Chapters, in: Francisco Cabrillo & Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro (ed.), Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions, chapter 16, pages 297-312, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    17. Todd Sandler, 2015. "Collective action: fifty years later," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 195-216, September.

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