IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

How Does the Governance of Academic Faculties Affect Competition Among Them?

Listed author(s):
  • Prüfer, J.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Walz, U.

We analyze competition among academic faculties for new researchers. The value to individual members through social interaction within the faculty depends on the average status of their fellow members. When competing for new members, existing members trade off the effect of entry on average status of the faculty against the reduction in teaching load that can be bought if no entry takes place and the entrant's wage is saved. We show that the best candidates join the best faculties but that they receive lower wages than some lower-ranking candidates. Endogenizing the governance structure of the faculties, we show that the aggregate surplus of a faculty is maximized if a decision-making rule is implemented that makes the average faculty member pivotal. Our main policy implication is that consensus-based faculties, such as many in Europe, could improve the well-being of their members if they liberalized their internal decision making processes.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/1099967/2009-49.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2009-49.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2009
Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:f0e504a7-78a7-4315-8517-e685a42a783f
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Barbera, S. & Maschler, M. & Shalev, J., 2001. "Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 40-78, October.
  2. Cornes,Richard & Sandler,Todd, 1996. "The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521477185, December.
  3. Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John T, 1980. "The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1481-1521, December.
  4. Hansmann, Henry, 1986. "A Theory of Status Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 119-130, Spring.
  5. Scott E. Masten, 2006. "Authority and Commitment: Why Universities, Like Legislatures, Are Not Organized as Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 649-684, September.
  6. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1998. "Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 33-62, March.
  7. Robert W. Helsley & William C. Strange, 1991. "Exclusion and the Theory of Clubs," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 24(4), pages 889-899, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:f0e504a7-78a7-4315-8517-e685a42a783f. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Richard Broekman)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.