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Collective Reputation in Higher Education: An Equilibrium Model

Author

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  • Polishchuk, L.

    (State University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

Higher education is valued as a source of skills and knowledge, and also as means to signal à talent of degree holders. The policy reforms intended to make higher education more accessible and strengthen incentives for quality.second of these benefits, unlike the first one, could survive a decline of academic standards. A model of post-secondary education is considered where there are two categories of universities - mass and elite, and their separation is maintained by collective reputation. The model produces an equilibrium in which the university system can still be used for signaling but makes no contribution to the human capital accumulation. The model describes the outcomes of the recent transformation of the Russian university system which was driven primarily by the profit-seeking motives and witnessed precipitous drop of the quality of post-secondary education in both mass and elite segments. That model can also be used to assess

Suggested Citation

  • Polishchuk, L., 2010. "Collective Reputation in Higher Education: An Equilibrium Model," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 7, pages 46-69.
    • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2010:i:7:p:46-69
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Borisova, E. & Polishchuk, L. & Suvorov, A., 2014. "Observe or Violate: Intrinsic Motivation of Academic Ethics," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 22(2), pages 41-72.
    2. Fridman, A. & Verbetskaia, M., 2020. "Government regulation of the market for higher education," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 45(1), pages 12-43.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    market signaling; collective reputation; single-crossing condition; university rating;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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