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Collective Reputation in Higher Education: An Equilibrium Model

  • Polishchuk, L.

    (State University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia)

Higher education is valued as a source of skills and knowledge, and also as means to signal à talent of degree holders. The policy reforms intended to make higher education more accessible and strengthen incentives for quality.second of these benefits, unlike the first one, could survive a decline of academic standards. A model of post-secondary education is considered where there are two categories of universities - mass and elite, and their separation is maintained by collective reputation. The model produces an equilibrium in which the university system can still be used for signaling but makes no contribution to the human capital accumulation. The model describes the outcomes of the recent transformation of the Russian university system which was driven primarily by the profit-seeking motives and witnessed precipitous drop of the quality of post-secondary education in both mass and elite segments. That model can also be used to assess

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Article provided by New Economic Association in its journal Journal of the New Economic Association.

Volume (Year): (2010)
Issue (Month): 7 ()
Pages: 46-69

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Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2010:i:7:p:46-69
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  1. Nick Feltovich & Richmond Harbaugh & Ted To, 2002. "Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 630-649, Winter.
  2. Weiss, Andrew, 1983. "A Sorting-cum-Learning Model of Education," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 420-42, June.
  3. H. Peyton Young, 1996. "The Economics of Convention," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 105-122, Spring.
  4. Tirole, Jean, 1994. ""A Theory of Collective Reputations" with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality," IDEI Working Papers 38, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  5. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1998. "Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 33-62, March.
  6. Dennis Epple & Richard Romano, 2002. "Educational Vouchers and Cream Skimming," NBER Working Papers 9354, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Fershtman, C. & Murphy, K.M., 1993. "Social Status, Education and Growth," Papers 8-93, Tel Aviv.
  8. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  9. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1975. "The Theory of "Screening," Education, and the Distribution of Income," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 283-300, June.
  10. Dominic J. Brewer & Eric R. Eide & Ronald G. Ehrenberg, 1999. "Does It Pay to Attend an Elite Private College? Cross-Cohort Evidence on the Effects of College Type on Earnings," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 34(1), pages 104-123.
  11. Andrew Weiss, 1995. "Human Capital vs. Signalling Explanations of Wages," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 133-154, Fall.
  12. Charles T. Clotfelter, 1996. "Buying the Best: Cost Escalation in Elite Higher Education," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number clot96-1.
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