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On the Optimal Allocation of Students and Resources in a System of Higher Education

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Listed:
  • Sallee James M

    (University of Michigan)

  • Resch Alexandra M

    (University of Michigan)

  • Courant Paul N

    (University of Michigan)

Abstract

We model the social planner's decision to establish universities and populate them with students and resources, given a distribution of student ability and a limited pool of resources for higher education. If student ability and school resources are complements, and if there is a fixed cost to establishing a school, then the optimal allocation will involve a tiered system of higher education that sorts students by ability. In contrast to previous research, we show this tiered system is optimal even in the absence of peer effects. In considering where to locate students, the planner balances the benefit of providing students with more resources against the congestion costs of overcrowding schools. Nearly identical students who are close to the margin of entry to a higher or lower tier will experience discrete gaps in education quality. In considering how many universities to establish, the planner will balance the value of more precise tailoring against the cost of establishing additional schools. The planner's inability to perfectly tailor education quality will result in both winners and losers. Our model also makes predictions about how university systems that serve different populations should vary. Larger systems will produce more per dollar of expenditures and more education per student, due to economies of scale.

Suggested Citation

  • Sallee James M & Resch Alexandra M & Courant Paul N, 2008. "On the Optimal Allocation of Students and Resources in a System of Higher Education," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-26, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:8:y:2008:i:1:n:11
    DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.1871
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Courant, Paul N. & McPherson, Michael & Resch, Alexandra M., 2006. "The Public Role in Higher Education," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 59(2), pages 291-318, June.
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    6. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1998. "Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 33-62, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joan Roselló Villalonga, 2017. "Does Decentralization in the Provision of Higher Education Increase Quality of Education?," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 220(1), pages 13-55, March.
    2. Brad J. Hershbein, 2013. "Worker Signals among New College Graduates: The Role of Selectivity and GPA," Upjohn Working Papers 13-190, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    3. Eleanor Wiske Dillon & Jeffrey Andrew Smith, 2017. "Determinants of the Match between Student Ability and College Quality," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 45-66.
    4. Caroline M. Hoxby, 2009. "The Changing Selectivity of American Colleges," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(4), pages 95-118, Fall.
    5. Pugatch, Todd & Thompson, Paul N., 2022. "Excellence for All? University Honors Programs and Human Capital Formation," IZA Discussion Papers 15354, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Cao, Yuan, 2020. "Centralized assignment mechanisms and assortative matching: Evidence from Chinese universities," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 255-276.
    7. Zhong, Xiaohan & Zhu, Lin, 2021. "The medium-run efficiency consequences of unfair school matching: Evidence from Chinese college admissions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 224(2), pages 271-285.
    8. Eleanor Wiske Dillon & Jeffrey Andrew Smith, 2013. "The Determinants of Mismatch Between Students and Colleges," NBER Working Papers 19286, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Caroline M. Hoxby & Sarah Turner, 2019. "Measuring Opportunity in U.S. Higher Education," NBER Working Papers 25479, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Amanda M. Cook, 2022. "Margins that Matter: Exploring the Association Between Academic Match and Bachelor’s Degree Completion Over Time," Research in Higher Education, Springer;Association for Institutional Research, vol. 63(4), pages 672-712, June.

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