IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/lmu/muenar/43526.html

Relational contracts for household formation, fertility choice and separation

Author

Listed:
  • Fahn, Matthias
  • Rees, Ray
  • Wuppermann, Amelie

Abstract

This paper applies the theory of relational contracts to a model in which a couple decides upon fertility and subsequently on continuation of the relationship. We formalize the idea that within-household-cooperation can be supported by self-interest. Since the costs of raising children-a household public good-are unequally distributed between partners, a conflict between individually optimal and efficient decisions exists. Side-payments can support cooperation but are not legally enforceable and thus have to be part of an equilibrium. This requires stable relationships and credible punishment threats. Within this framework, we analyze the effects of separation costs and post-separation alimony payments on couples' fertility decisions. We derive the predictions that higher separation costs and higher alimony payments facilitate cooperation and hence increase fertility. We present empirical evidence based on a recent German reform that reduced rights to post-divorce alimony payments. We find that this reform reduced in-wedlock fertility.

Suggested Citation

  • Fahn, Matthias & Rees, Ray & Wuppermann, Amelie, 2016. "Relational contracts for household formation, fertility choice and separation," Munich Reprints in Economics 43526, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:43526
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bredtmann, Julia & Vonnahme, Christina, 2017. "Less Alimony after Divorce: Spouses' Behavioral Response to the 2008 Alimony Reform in Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 10864, IZA Network @ LISER.
    2. Abraham Chigavazira & Hayley Fisher & Tim Robinson & Anna Zhu, 2019. "The Consequences of Extending Equitable Property Division Divorce Laws to Cohabitants," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2019n03, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
    3. Görges, Luise, 2021. "Of housewives and feminists: Gender norms and intra-household division of labour," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    4. Adamecz, Anna & Lovász, Anna & Vujic, Suncica, 2024. "Beyond the Degree: Fertility Outcomes of 'First in Family' Graduates," IZA Discussion Papers 17216, IZA Network @ LISER.
    5. Usman, Sehrish, 2024. "Preparing for the worst: post-divorce instability risk and economic behaviour of households," MPRA Paper 122675, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Luise Görges, 2021. "Of housewives and feminists: Gender norms and intra-household division of labour," Working Paper Series in Economics 400, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
    7. Chen, Shuai, 2019. "Marriage, minorities, and mass movements," Other publications TiSEM 9cb1b11d-12e6-46a8-adca-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Julia Bredtmann & Christina Vonnahme, 2019. "Less money after divorce – how the 2008 alimony reform in Germany affected spouses’ labor supply, leisure and marital stability," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 1191-1223, December.
    9. Usman, Sehrish, 2024. "Preparing for the worst: post-divorce instability risk and economic behaviour of households," MPRA Paper 122806, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Nov 2024.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:43526. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tamilla Benkelberg (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.