Less alimony after divorce: Spouses' behavioral response to the 2008 alimony reform in Germany
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- Bredtmann, Julia & Vonnahme, Christina, 2017. "Less Alimony after Divorce: Spouses' Behavioral Response to the 2008 Alimony Reform in Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 10864, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Julia Bredtmann & Christina Vonnahme, 2017. "Less Alimony after Divorce – Spouses’ Behavioral Response to the 2008 Alimony Reform in Germany," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 942, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Schaubert, Marianna, 2018. "Do Alimony Regulations Matter inside Marriage? Evidence from the 2008 Reform of the German Maintenance Law," EconStor Preprints 173193, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- Schaubert, Marianna, 2018. "Do Alimony Regulations Matter inside Marriage? Evidence from the 2008 Reform of the German Maintenance Law," VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy 181508, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
More about this item
Keywords
alimony; marital instability; female labor supply; intra-household bargaining;JEL classification:
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DEM-2017-11-19 (Demographic Economics)
- NEP-EUR-2017-11-19 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-LAW-2017-11-19 (Law & Economics)
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