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Manager- und transaktionsspezifische Determinanten der Performance von Arbitrage CLOs

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  • Scholz, Julia

Abstract

Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Determinanten der Performance europäischer Arbitrage Collateralized Loan Obligations für das Jahr 2009. Der Fokus liegt dabei auf der Bedeutung der performanceabhängigen Vergütung des CLO-Managers, den Eigenschaften des CLO-Managers und der Transaktionscharakteristika als mögliche Einflussfaktoren der Rating Performance. Es wird gezeigt, dass Transaktionen, bei denen dem CLO-Manager eine Incentive Management Fee gewährt wird, mit einer höheren Wahrscheinlichkeit herabgestuft werden als Transaktionen ohne Incentive Fee. Dieser Befund bestätigt die Hypothese, dass durch die Incentive Fee Risikoanreize für CLO-Manager geschaffen werden. Des Weiteren wird ein positiver Zusammenhang zwischen der Erfahrung bzw. der Größe eines CLO-Managers und der Rating Performance festgestellt. Der Einfluss des Managers auf die Performance einer CLO-Transaktion wird auch an den weiteren in der Studie herangezogenen managerspezifischen Charakteristika wie Typ und Unternehmenssitz bestätigt. Für die Transaktionscharakteristika wird hingegen im betrachteten Untersuchungszeitraum kein signifikanter Einfluss auf die Rating Performance nachgewiesen.

Suggested Citation

  • Scholz, Julia, 2011. "Manager- und transaktionsspezifische Determinanten der Performance von Arbitrage CLOs," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 12144, University of Munich, Munich School of Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:lmu:msmdpa:12144
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Verbriefung; Collateralized Loan Obligations; Collateral Manager; CLO-Management; Anreize; Ratingherabstufungen;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage

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