IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Are Hard-Working MPs Electorally Rewarded? Empirical Evidence from the 2007 French Legislative Elections

Listed author(s):
  • Abel FRANCOIS

    ()

    (LEM-CNRS (UMR 9221), Université de Lille 1 Sciences et Technologies)

  • Julien NAVARRO

    ()

    (ESPOL, Université Catholique de Lille)

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of incumbent MPs’ activities on their electoral fortune. In other words, are incumbents with a strong parliamentary record rewarded by their party and their voters? We ask this question in the context of the French political system characterized by: an executive domination; a candidate-centered electoral system; and an electoral agenda maximizing the impact of the presidential elections. Since these three institutional features have contradictory expected effects on relationship between MP’s activities and electoral fortune, their overall impact can only be assessed empirically. Taking the 2007 French legislative elections as a study case, we test the effects of several measurements of the MPs’ activities on both votes share and reelection probability, and we take into account the potential bias related to the decision to be candidate. Our results show that MPs’ activities differently impact both the incumbents’ candidacy prospects, their first-round vote share and their reelection. Despite the weakness of the French National Assembly, it is demonstrated that several parliamentary activities, especially bill-initiation, have a positive effect on the MPs’ probability of running again and staying in office.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://ifs.u-strasbg.fr/large/publications/2017/2017-07.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg in its series Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center with number 2017-07.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2017
Handle: RePEc:lar:wpaper:2017-07
Contact details of provider: Postal:
61, Avenue de la Forêt Noire, F-67085 Strasbourg Cedex

Phone: (33) 3 90 41 41 30
Fax: (33) 3 90 41 40 50
Web page: http://ifs.unistra.fr/large

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Julien Navarro & Nicolas Gérard Vaillant & François-Charles Wolff, 2012. "Mesurer l'efficacité des députés au sein du Parlement français : l'apport des techniques de frontières non-paramétriques," Working Papers hal-00719382, HAL.
  2. Heckman, James, 2013. "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Applied Econometrics, Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
  3. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lar:wpaper:2017-07. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christophe J. Godlewski)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.