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Are Hard-Working MPs Electorally Rewarded? Empirical Evidence from the 2007 French Legislative Elections

Author

Listed:
  • Abel FRANCOIS

    () (LEM-CNRS (UMR 9221), Université de Lille 1 Sciences et Technologies)

  • Julien NAVARRO

    () (ESPOL, Université Catholique de Lille)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of incumbent MPs’ activities on their electoral fortune. In other words, are incumbents with a strong parliamentary record rewarded by their party and their voters? We ask this question in the context of the French political system characterized by: an executive domination; a candidate-centered electoral system; and an electoral agenda maximizing the impact of the presidential elections. Since these three institutional features have contradictory expected effects on relationship between MP’s activities and electoral fortune, their overall impact can only be assessed empirically. Taking the 2007 French legislative elections as a study case, we test the effects of several measurements of the MPs’ activities on both votes share and reelection probability, and we take into account the potential bias related to the decision to be candidate. Our results show that MPs’ activities differently impact both the incumbents’ candidacy prospects, their first-round vote share and their reelection. Despite the weakness of the French National Assembly, it is demonstrated that several parliamentary activities, especially bill-initiation, have a positive effect on the MPs’ probability of running again and staying in office.

Suggested Citation

  • Abel FRANCOIS & Julien NAVARRO, 2017. "Are Hard-Working MPs Electorally Rewarded? Empirical Evidence from the 2007 French Legislative Elections," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2017-07, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
  • Handle: RePEc:lar:wpaper:2017-07
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    File URL: http://ifs.u-strasbg.fr/large/publications/2017/2017-07.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. J. Navarro & F.Ch. Wolff & N. Vaillant, 2012. "Mesurer l'efficacité des députés au sein du Parlement français : l'apport des techniques de frontières non-paramétriques," Post-Print hal-00787881, HAL.
    2. Heckman, James, 2013. "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Applied Econometrics, Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
    3. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Personal voting; Parliamentary activities and productivity; Incumbent candidacy and reelection; Electoral reward.;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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