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Diplomatic Intervention in Civil War : Trade for All or Trade for One?

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  • Mathieu COUTTENIER
  • Raphael SOUBEYRAN

Abstract

This paper looks at whether diplomatic intervention in civil war has affected trade over the post World War II period. We show that the intervener derives no commercial advantage from diplomatic intervention ; trade between the intervener and the target country does not increase more than trade between the target country and its other partners. However, we find that diplomatic intervention has a positive and persistent effect on trade between the target country and all its partners. Keywords : Civil War, Trade, Foreign Influence, Gravity Equation.

Suggested Citation

  • Mathieu COUTTENIER & Raphael SOUBEYRAN, 2011. "Diplomatic Intervention in Civil War : Trade for All or Trade for One?," Working Papers 11-08, LAMETA, Universitiy of Montpellier, revised Apr 2011.
  • Handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:11-08
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    File URL: http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/Documents/DR2011-08.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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