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Competition and the Bad News Principle in a Real Options Framework

Author

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  • Katsumasa Nishide

    () (Department of Economics, Yokohama National University)

  • Kyoko Yagi

    () (Department of Management Science and Engineering, Akita Prefectural University)

Abstract

We study the investment timing problem where two firms that compete for investment preemption know in advance the time at which the economic condition changes. We show that the so-called Bad News Principle applies to the leader firm’s investment decision near maturity in many cases. This result indicates that the option value to wait does have an impact even in a competitive situation, which is in contrast to the previous literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Katsumasa Nishide & Kyoko Yagi, 2013. "Competition and the Bad News Principle in a Real Options Framework," KIER Working Papers 860, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:kyo:wpaper:860
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    File URL: http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/DP/DP860.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nishide, Katsumasa & Nomi, Ernesto Kazuhiro, 2009. "Regime uncertainty and optimal investment timing," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(10), pages 1796-1807, October.
    2. Alesina, Alberto & Perotti, Roberto, 1996. "Income distribution, political instability, and investment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 1203-1228, June.
    3. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1995. "Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 207-227, November.
    4. Bouis, Romain & Huisman, Kuno J.M. & Kort, Peter M., 2009. "Investment in oligopoly under uncertainty: The accordion effect," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 320-331, March.
    5. Helen Weeds, 2002. "Strategic Delay in a Real Options Model of R&D Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 729-747.
    6. Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1995. "Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Indicators," MPRA Paper 23118, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Steven R. Grenadier, 2002. "Option Exercise Games: An Application to the Equilibrium Investment Strategies of Firms," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(3), pages 691-721.
    8. Perotti, Roberto & Alesina, Alberto, 1996. "Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment," Scholarly Articles 4553018, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    9. Joaquin, Domingo Castelo & Khanna, Naveen, 2001. "Investment timing decisions under threat of potential competition: Why firm size matters1," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-17.
    10. Makoto Goto & Katsumasa Nishide & Ryuta Takashima, 2013. "Irreversible Investment under Competition with a Markov Switching Regime," KIER Working Papers 861, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    11. Robert Lensink, 2002. "Is the uncertainty-investment link non-linear? Empirical evidence for developed economies," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 138(1), pages 131-147, March.
    12. Nielsen, Martin J., 2002. "Competition and irreversible investments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 731-743, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bad news principle; investment timing; competition; real options;

    JEL classification:

    • D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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