Motives of Sanctioning: Equity and Emotions in a Public Good Experiment with Punishment
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More about this item
KeywordsPublic good games; Punishment; Experiments; Conditional cooperation;
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-08-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2012-08-23 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2012-08-23 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2012-08-23 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-08-23 (Game Theory)
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