People exhibit group reciprocity when they retaliate, not against the person who harmed them, but against somebody else in that person's group. Group reciprocity may be a key motivation behind intergroup conflict. We investigated group reciprocity in a laboratory experiment. After a group identity manipulation, subjects played a Prisoner's Dilemma with others from different groups. Subjects then allocated money between themselves and others, learning the group of the others. Subjects who knew that their partner in the Prisoner's Dilemma had defected became relatively less generous to people from the partner's group, compared to a third group. We use our experiment to develop hypotheses about group reciprocity and its correlates.
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- Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap & Daniel John Zizzo, 2009. "The Value of Groups," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 295-323, March.
- Reuben, Ernesto & van Winden, Frans, 2008.
"Social ties and coordination on negative reciprocity: The role of affect,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 92(1-2), pages 34-53, February.
- Ernesto Reuben & Frans van Winden, . "Social Ties and Coordination on Negative Reciprocity: The Role of Affect," Discussion Papers 06-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Ernesto Reuben & Frans van Winden, 2004. "Reciprocity and Emotions when Reciprocators know each other," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-098/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Ernesto Reuben & Frans van Winden, 2006. "Reciprocity and Emotions when Reciprocators Know each other," CESifo Working Paper Series 1674, CESifo Group Munich.
- Gary Bornstein, 2002. "Intergroup conflict: Individual, group and collective interests," Discussion Paper Series dp297, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Francesco Guala & Luigi Mittone & Matteo Ploner, 2009. "Group Membership, Team Preferences, and Expectations (A new version of this paper is available as CEEL WP 3-12)," CEEL Working Papers 0906, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
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