How Trade Unions Increase Welfare
Historically, worker movements have played a crucial role in making workplaces safer. Firms traditionally oppose better health standards. According to our in- terpretation, workplace safety is costly for firms but increases average health of workers and thereby aggregate labour supply. A laissez-faire approach in which firms set safety standards is suboptimal as workers are not fully informed of health risks associated with jobs. Safety standards set by better-informed trade unions are output and welfare increasing.
|Date of creation:||19 Aug 2010|
|Date of revision:||19 Aug 2010|
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