IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/jau/wpaper/2019-01.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Market size asymmetry and industrial policy in an international duopoly: Environmental tax vs. production subsidy

Author

Listed:
  • Lidia Vidal-Meliá

    () (LEE & Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain)

  • Eva Camacho-Cuena

    () (LEE & Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain)

  • Miguel Ginés-Vilar

    () (LEE & Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain)

Abstract

This paper analyzes how international trade affects the governments’ decision on their industrial policy in the context of bilateral international trade and imperfect competition. We model an international duopoly with market size asymmetry and product heterogeneity. Each firm produces two different products, one for the domestic market and the other one for the foreign market, where the firms’ production generates local emissions. The findings of our paper show the important role of market asymmetry in determining the optimal industrial policy in a setting where both, firms and regulators, act strategically. The government in each country decides, as industrial policy between two option: an emission tax or a production subsidy. We find that the governments in small countries have incentives to set an environmental tax to the firms competing in international markets with similar size. This is the case even if the government in the large market decided to set a production subsidy, as long as market size asymmetry is low enough. Instead, if firms in a small country compete in large markets, that is, increasing the market size asymmetry between countries, it is then optimal for the government in the small country to give up emission taxes and pay productions subsidies to keep the firms’ competitiveness in the home and foreign markets if the government in the big country subsidizes production. In this case, an increase in the firms’ profits offsets the effects of emission damages on the country social welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Lidia Vidal-Meliá & Eva Camacho-Cuena & Miguel Ginés-Vilar, 2019. "Market size asymmetry and industrial policy in an international duopoly: Environmental tax vs. production subsidy," Working Papers 2019/01, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
  • Handle: RePEc:jau:wpaper:2019/01
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.doctreballeco.uji.es/wpficheros/Vidal_et_al_01_2019.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carolyn Fischer, 2017. "Environmental Protection for Sale: Strategic Green Industrial Policy and Climate Finance," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 66(3), pages 553-575, March.
    2. Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406.
    3. Jessica Jewell & David Mccollum & Johannes Emmerling & Christoph Bertram & David Gernaat & Volker Krey & Leonidas Paroussos & Loïc Berger & Kostas Fragkiadakis & Ilkka Keppo & Nawfal Saadi & Massimo T, 2018. "Limited emission reductions from fuel subsidy removal except in energy-exporting regions," Post-Print hal-01744617, HAL.
    4. Brian R. Copeland & M. Scott Taylor, 2004. "Trade, Growth, and the Environment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(1), pages 7-71, March.
    5. Takao Asano & Noriaki Matsushima, 2014. "Environmental regulation and technology transfers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 47(3), pages 889-904, August.
    6. Lai, Yu-Bong & Hu, Chia-Hsien, 2008. "Trade agreements, domestic environmental regulation, and transboundary pollution," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 209-228, May.
    7. Dixit, Avinash, 1984. "International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376a), pages 1-16, Supplemen.
    8. Frondel, Manuel & Kambeck, Rainer & Schmidt, Christoph M., 2007. "Hard coal subsidies: A never-ending story?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(7), pages 3807-3814, July.
    9. Burguet, Roberto & Sempere, Jaume, 2003. "Trade liberalization, environmental policy, and welfare," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 25-37, July.
    10. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
    11. R. Simpson, 1995. "Optimal pollution taxation in a Cournot duopoly," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 6(4), pages 359-369, December.
    12. Soham Baksi & Amrita Ray chaudhuri, 2009. "On trade liberalization and transboundary pollution," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(4), pages 2605-2612.
    13. Yann Duval & Stephen Hamilton, 2002. "Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade in Asymmetric Oligopoly Markets," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(3), pages 259-271, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental tax; Production subsidy; Market size asymmetry; Product heterogeneity; Imperfect markets;

    JEL classification:

    • F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jau:wpaper:2019/01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (María Aurora Garcia Gallego). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ueujies.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.